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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Concluding That Sgt. Baldwin Lacked Reasonable 
Suspicion To Stop Pettit’s Vehicle For Failing To Signal Before Turning Right At 
The Intersection 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The district court erred in concluding that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop Pettit’s vehicle for violating I.C. § 49-808(1) and by affirming the 
magistrate court’s suppression order.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.5-12.)  In his 
Respondent’s brief, Pettit argues that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion 
for the traffic stop because Pettit maintained his lane of travel and remained on 
Highway 95 through the intersection, and therefore did not turn “onto a highway” 
pursuant to the plain language of the signal requirement of I.C. § 49-808(1).  
(Respondent’s brief, pp.3-11.)  A review of the record reveals that Pettit turned 
onto a highway, and thus was required to signal, when he made a physical right 
turn through an intersection, as directed by traffic signs and a green turn arrow. 
 
B. Sgt. Baldwin Possessed Reasonable Suspicion That Pettit Violated I.C. 
§ 49-808(1) By Failing To Signal 
 
Idaho Code § 49-808(1) provides, in relevant part, that a driver must 
signal when he “turn[s] a vehicle onto a highway.”  Pettit contends that he was 
not required to signal at the intersection prior to the traffic stop in this case 
because “he was maintaining the same lane and continuing on the same 
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highway.”1  (Respondent’s brief, p.3.)  Specifically, Pettit contends that the plain 
meaning of the term “onto” requires a “change of position,” i.e., “to move yourself 
‘onto’ something, you must not have been ‘on’ it to begin with.”  (Respondent’s 
brief, p.5 (footnote omitted).)  Because, Pettit asserts, he was traveling on the 
road designated as “Highway 95” before and after the intersection, he did not 
travel “onto” a new highway, and therefore, no signal was required.  (Id.) 
The state agrees that, pursuant to the plain language of the term “onto” as 
utilized by I.C. § 49-808(1), a driver is required to signal only when he turns onto 
a highway that he was not on prior to the turn.  Therefore, it appears that the 
issue on appeal turns on the plain language of the term “highway,” and 
specifically, when one highway ends and another begins in the circumstances of 
this case.2   
                                            
1 Pettit also appears to argue that interpreting the statute as written and/or in the 
manner proposed by the state would lead to a “palpably absurd” result.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp.3, 5, 10.)  However, the Idaho Supreme Court abrogated 
the previously-recognized principle that an Idaho appellate court has the 
authority to modify an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is palpably 
absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written.  Verska v. 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896, 265 P.3d 
502, 507-509 (2011).  Pettit does not contend that I.C. § 49-808(1) is ambiguous.  
(See generally Respondent’s brief.) 
 
 
2 Idaho Code § 49-109(5) defines the term “highway” as utilized in Title 49 of the 
Idaho Code, but this definition does not expressly answer the question of when 
one highway ends and another one begins.  I.C. § 49-109(5) (“Highway” means 
the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained 
when any part is open to the use of the public for vehicular travel, with jurisdiction 
extending to the adjacent property line, including sidewalks, shoulders, berms 
and rights-of-way not intended for motorized traffic. The term ‘street’ is 
interchangeable with highway.”). 
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The district court erred by adequately considering only two factors in 
making this determination: (1) that Pettit effectuated his turn from a right-turn only 
lane; and (2) that Pettit remained on Highway 95 South through the intersection.  
(See Appellant’s brief, p.8 (citing R., pp.134-135).)  Neither I.C. § 49-808(1) nor 
the plain meaning of the term “highway” recognize these two factors as being 
dispositive to the question of when one highway ends and another begins.  The 
state asserts that, without such an express directive, an analysis of I.C. § 49-
808(1) and of the plain meaning of the term “highway” requires a case-by-case 
consideration of relevant factors.  
As the state previously argued, in the circumstances of this case, the 
magistrate court and district court inadequately considered: (1) several posted 
traffic signs that displayed arrows indicating that a driver in Pettit’s lane was 
required to make a right turn; (2) a green traffic arrow at the intersection 
specifically required a driver in Pettit’s lane to turn right; (3) the physical 
characteristics of the road, which led Pettit from the right lane to a right turn 
through the intersection; and (4) the relationship between Highway 95 South and 
the other roads at the intersection, where a driver must choose the appropriate 
lane and then either turn left, go straight, or as Pettit did, turn right.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.11 (citing State’s Exhibits 3-7).)  A reasonable driver, faced with a green 
right arrow, and street signs displaying arrows requiring a right turn from a 
particular lane, would understand that he was “turning onto a highway” pursuant 
to the plain meaning of I.C. § 49-808(1), even though the name of the road 
happened to remain the same through the intersection.       
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 The factual finding made by the magistrate court, and affirmed by the 
district court, that Pettit’s movement through the intersection did not constitute a 
turn onto a “highway” pursuant to I.C. § 49-808(1) was therefore incorrect and 
unsupported by substantial evidence.  Further, the district court erred by relying 
on this erroneous factual finding to conclude that the plain language of the signal 
requirement of I.C. § 49-808(1) did not require Pettit to signal prior to traveling 
through the intersection.  Likewise, the district court thus erred in concluding that 
Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Pettit’s vehicle, and in affirming 
the magistrate court’s suppression order. 
 
II. 
Suppression Of Evidence Is Not The Appropriate Remedy When The Statute 
Upon Which The Underlying Seizure Was Based Is Subsequently Declared 
Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied  
 
A. Introduction 
 
Because it concluded that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion to 
stop Pettit’s vehicle, the court did not reach the issue raised by Pettit in his 
motion to suppress that I.C. § 49-808(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied 
to him.  (R., pp.35-39.)  Anticipating that Pettit would renew this argument on 
appeal, the state, in its Appellant’s brief, argued that I.C. § 49-808(1) was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit, and that, in any event, and pursuant 
to Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-40 (1979), suppression is not the 
appropriate remedy when the statute upon which an underlying seizure was 
based is subsequently declared unconstitutional.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-17.)    
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In his Respondent’s brief, in addition to renewing this constitutional 
argument, Pettit argues that the state failed to preserve its contention that 
suppression was unwarranted pursuant to DeFillippo.  (Respondent’s brief, 
pp.11-20.)  Pettit also argues that DeFillippo does not apply to Idaho 
Constitutional challenges because Article I, § 17 provides greater protections 
than the Fourth Amendment in this context.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.15-20.)  
Pettit’s arguments fail.  This Court may apply the correct law to the facts of this 
case and consider the state’s DeFillippo argument.  Further, the rationale of 
DeFillippo applies to challenges made under the Idaho Constitution. 
 
B. The State’s DeFillippo Argument Is Not Waived On Appeal 
 
In its Appellant’s brief, the state argued that a constitutionally valid seizure 
is not rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law on which the 
seizure was based is unconstitutionally vague.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14 (citing 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37-40; United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1125 
(7th Cir. 1999); see also Heien v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 530, 
535-540 (2014) (reaffirming and relying upon DeFillippo in concluding that where 
an officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake of law in conducting a traffic 
stop, the Fourth Amendment does not require the suppression of evidence that 
was obtained as a result of the stop).  
Pettit contends that this argument is waived on appeal because the state 
failed to raise it below.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.14-15 (citing State v. Dewbre, 
133 Idaho 663, 667, 991 P.2d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1999) (precluding defendant-
appellant’s attempt to raise a claim, for the first time on appeal, that a statute was 
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unconstitutionally vague); and State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 
126 (1992) (precluding defendant-appellant’s attempt to raise a claim, for the first 
time on appeal, that a statute violated constitutional separation of powers 
provisions and his constitutional right to a jury trial).3    
While it is true that an appellant may generally not challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute (or raise any other issue), for the first time on appeal, 
this is not the scenario in the present case.  Instead, the state requests that this 
Court apply the correct law to a legal question properly before it.  The issue of 
whether the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable was raised by Pettit in his 
motion to suppress.  (R., pp.34-43.)  In affirming the magistrate court’s 
suppression order, the district court made “an adverse ruling which forms the 
basis for an assignment of error.”  State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 
290, 296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 
(1993)); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998) 
(issues actually decided by trial court are subject to appellate review).    
The prosecutor did not have a duty to fully negate every legal claim 
proposed in the motion to suppress.  State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599 n.1, 
237 P.3d 1222, 1225 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010) (appellate court not limited in challenge 
                                            
3 In his Respondent’s brief, Pettit argues that the state’s Appellant’s brief 
incorrectly “indicates that the State argued below that suppression was not the 
appropriate remedy when a statute is declared void for vagueness.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p.14 (citing Appellant’s brief, p.17).)  This is incorrect.  In its 
brief, the state instead noted that it had raised to the district court its argument 
that “any mistake of law made by Sgt. Baldwin was objectively reasonable, and 
thus, suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.17; see also Part III, below.)  The state did not contend that it raised the 
separate DeFillippo argument to the district court.   The state acknowledges that 
it did not.   
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to ruling on suppression to legal arguments of prosecutor); State v. Bower, 
135 Idaho 554, 557-58, 21 P.3d 491, 494-495 (Ct. App. 2001) (state need not 
articulate every legal theory justifying search where constitutionality of search is 
brought into issue by a defense motion to suppress and countered by 
presentation of evidence).   
Further, in ruling on motions to suppress, courts freely review the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to the facts as found.  See Bower, 
135 Idaho at 557-558, 21 P.3d at 494-495; see also State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 
121, 124, 795 P.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 2000) (“The lawfulness of a search is to be 
determined by the court, based upon an objective assessment of the 
circumstances which confronted the officer at the time of the search.”).  
Therefore, this Court may consider the state’s DeFillippo argument on appeal.   
 
C. When A Statute Upon Which A Seizure Is Based Is Subsequently Deemed 
Unconstitutional, Suppression Is Not The Appropriate Remedy 
 
Pettit notes that it is “well established” that Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment.  
(Respondent’s brief, p.16.)  As examples, Pettit cites State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 
43, 258 P. 788 (1927), in which the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the 
exclusionary rule several decades before the United States Supreme Court did, 
and State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012), in which the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed state precedent holding that the federal good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of Article I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.15-19.)  In Koivu, Pettit notes, 
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the Idaho Supreme Court explained that while the exclusionary rule derived from 
the Fourth Amendment is designed only to deter police misconduct, the 
independent exclusionary rule derived from Article I, § 17 also provides 
suppression as a remedy to citizens whose constitutional rights have been 
violated.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.17-18.)  Pettit further contends that applying 
DeFillippo to challenges made pursuant to Article I, § 17 would constitute a 
“reject[ion] [of] all Idaho precedent holding that Idaho’s independent exclusionary 
rule goes beyond just the purpose of deterring police misconduct.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p.19 (emphasis omitted).)    
While Pettit is correct that the Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted Article 
I, § 17 as providing more protection than the Fourth Amendment with respect to 
these contexts, this does not, as he asserts, compel a conclusion in this case that 
the rationale of DeFillippo is inapplicable to challenges raised under Article I, 
§ 17.  Unlike in Arregui and Koivu, the relevant issue raised in this case concerns 
the constitutionality of a statute.  The Idaho appellate courts, like the United 
States Supreme Court, employ a presumption of validity to statutes and 
ordinances.  “There is a strong presumption of the validity of an ordinance ….”  
State v. Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 744, 24 P.3d 59, 61 (2001) (quoting State v. 
Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998)).  See also State v. 
Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 518, 129 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Ct. App. 2006) (statute 
subjected to attack on constitutional validity grounds is entitled to presumption of 
validity).  At the time of the traffic stop, there was no reason for Sgt. Baldwin to 
suspect that I.C. § 49-808(1) suffered from any constitutional infirmity relevant to 
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the circumstances of that stop.  Indeed, Sgt. Baldwin had a duty to enforce that 
statute until and unless it was declared invalid by a court of law.   
Pettit’s assertion on appeal that “officers have been on notice since 2010 
regarding problems with the language of I.C. § 49-808(1)” (Respondent’s brief, 
p.19), due to Burton v. State of Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 748-750, 
240 P.3d 933, 935-937 (Ct. App. 2010), is misguided.  In that case, the Court of 
Appeals held that I.C. § 49-808(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Burton, under the distinguishable circumstances of that case – which analyzed 
whether a turn signal is required before one drives into a single lane that stems 
from the merger of two lanes.  The fact that Burton held that I.C. § 49-808(1) was 
unconstitutional as applied to Burton under those circumstances did not relieve 
Sgt. Baldwin of his duty to enforce the statute in all other circumstances.   
Pettit also notes that in Burton, the Court of Appeals did not apply the 
rationale of DeFillippo even though the officer in that case stopped the defendant 
for violating a presumptively valid statute that was only later deemed 
unconstitutional as applied in the circumstances of that case.  (Respondent’s 
brief, p.20.)  However, Burton is once again distinguishable.  In that case, the 
question of whether DeFillippo applied to an Idaho Constitutional challenge was 
not before the Court.  In fact, in Burton, the Idaho Court of Appeals did not 
expressly conduct an analysis pursuant to either the Fourth Amendment or  
Article I, § 17 – it is thus unclear whether Burton even raised a challenge under 
the Idaho Constitution.    
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Additionally, while at least one state appellate court has declined to apply 
DeFillippo on state law grounds (People v. Holmes, 45 N.E.3d 326, 335 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2015) (review pending)), that court did so because the state of Illinois 
employs the void ab initio doctrine with respect to state statutes which are 
deemed invalid.  Pursuant to this doctrine, a statute which is deemed 
unconstitutional is treated as though it never existed at all.  Holmes, 45 N.E.3d at 
335.  The state has found no Idaho case applying the void ab initio doctrine to 
state statutes in this manner.4 
A determination that I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague would 
warrant dismissal of a charge for failing to signal a lane change under that 
provision.  But under DeFillippo, for purposes of suppression, it is immaterial 
whether I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit.  This 
rationale applies to Pettit’s challenges made pursuant to both the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, § 17.  Therefore, even if I.C. § 49-808(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pettit and the circumstances of this case, 
such a finding would not undermine the validity of Sgt. Baldwin’s detention of 
Pettit.  Instead, Sgt. Baldwin had a constitutionally adequate basis to stop Pettit 
for violating I.C. § 49-808.   
 
 
 
                                            
4 Further, and in any event, the void ab initio doctrine would not apply to 
retroactively void a statute where the statute was merely deemed unconstitutional 
as applied in a particular case, to a particular defendant.  
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D. Idaho Code § 49-808(1) Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To 
Pettit And The Circumstances Of This Case 
 
Even assuming that suppression is the appropriate remedy when the 
statute upon which a seizure is based is subsequently deemed unconstitutional, 
Pettit is still not entitled to suppression because the signal requirement of I.C. 
§ 49-808(1) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him and the 
circumstances of this case.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.15-17.)  In his 
Respondent’s brief, Pettit contends that I.C. § 49-808(1) “does not give fair notice 
to a person of ordinary intelligence that a turn signal is required when maintaining 
the same lane of travel and remaining on the same highway.”  (Respondent’s 
brief, p.14.)  Because this is the same argument that Pettit set forth below, the 
state relies on the argument set forth in its Appellant’s brief.   
 
III. 
Even If Sgt. Baldwin Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Pettit’s Vehicle, This 
Mistake Of Law Was Objectively Reasonable And, Therefore, Suppression Is 
Unwarranted 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 After concluding that Sgt. Baldwin lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 
Pettit’s vehicle, the district court rejected the state’s alternative argument that 
suppression was still unwarranted because any mistake of law made by Sgt. 
Baldwin was objectively reasonable. (R., pp.143-145.)  Even assuming that the 
district court’s conclusion with respect to the reasonable suspicion for the stop 
was correct, the court erred in rejecting this alternative ground to deny Pettit’s 
suppression motion.     
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B. If Sgt. Baldwin’s Interpretation Of I.C. § 49-808(1) Was Erroneous, This 
Was A Reasonable Mistake Of Law Which Does Not Require Suppression 
 
In its Appellant’s brief, the state cited Heien v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. 
___, 135 S.Ct. 530, 534-540 (2014), for the proposition that, where an officer 
makes a reasonable mistake of law in the context of developing reasonable 
suspicion for a traffic stop, suppression is not warranted.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.18-22.)  The state also argued that any mistake of law made by Sgt. Baldwin 
was objectively reasonable because I.C. § 49-808(1) had never been interpreted 
by Idaho appellate courts to answer the relevant question of the underlying case, 
and because Sgt. Baldwin acted reasonably in concluding that Pettit’s action of 
turning from a lane controlled by a sign and traffic signal, both of which expressly 
indicated that a right turn was required, was a “turn...onto a highway” pursuant to 
I.C. § 49-808(1).  (Appellant’s brief, p.22.)  In response, Pettit argues that Heien 
is “very limited” and that Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law in this case was 
unreasonable because I.C. § 49-808(1) is not “genuinely ambiguous” like the 
relevant statute was in Heien.  (Respondent’s brief, pp.20-22.)      
For the reasons set forth in the state’s Appellant’s brief and above in Part I 
regarding I.C. § 49-808(1), this Court should hold that, even if I.C. § 49-808(1) 
did not require Pettit to signal prior to traveling through the intersection, 
suppression of evidence is not warranted because Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law 
was objectively reasonable.    
As the state previously argued, numerous potential factors may inform a 
police officer’s or court’s determination as to when, pursuant to I.C. § 49-808(1), 
a driver leaves one highway and turns onto another highway, necessitating a turn 
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signal.  In this case, the potential factors in this analysis include: (1) Pettit 
remained on “Highway 95” before and after his turn through the intersection; 
(2) at some unspecified point prior to the intersection, but not after it, Highway 95 
is also designated as Jackson Street; (3) Pettit entered the intersection in a right-
turn only lane; (4) several posted traffic signs contained arrows indicating that a 
driver in Pettit’s lane was required to make a right turn; (5) a green traffic arrow 
specifically required a driver in Pettit’s lane to turn right; (6) Pettit made a right 
turn of approximately 90 degrees at the intersection; and (7) a driver entering the 
intersection must choose the appropriate lane and then either turn left, go 
straight, or as Pettit did, turn right – a fact which distinguishes the intersection 
from a scenario in which a driver simply follows the course of a single road.  
(State’s Exhibits 3-7; see generally Tr.)  Because there is no express guidance in 
I.C. § 49-808(1) (or elsewhere in the Idaho Code), regarding how a police officer 
or court is to balance and weigh these factors, or which of these factors are 
dispositive and which should be disregarded, any error by Sgt. Baldwin in making 
this determination was objectively reasonable.   
The state further asserts, in the alternative to its argument set forth in Part 
I of its Appellant’s brief, and in response to the arguments made in Pettit’s 
Respondent’s brief, that if I.C. § 49-808(1) is ambiguous with respect to when 
one highway ends and another begins, than this ambiguity supports a conclusion 
that any mistake of law made by Sgt. Baldwin was objectively reasonable.  See 
Heien, __ U.S. at __, 135 S.Ct. at 541 (Kagan, E., concurring) (“If the statute is 
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genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard 
interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.”). 
Even assuming that I.C. § 49-808(1) did not require Pettit to signal prior to 
his right turn at the intersection, and that Sgt. Baldwin thus lacked reasonable 
suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop, Sgt. Baldwin’s mistake of law was 
objectively reasonable.  Therefore, the district court erred in rejecting this 
argument as set forth by the state below, because suppression was not 
warranted. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court’s 
appellate decision and the magistrate court’s order granting Pettit’s motion to 
suppress, and to remand for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 10th day of April, 2017. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Mark W. Olson________ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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